THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE: STANDARDS OF INTERPRETATION

When a law or regulation is said to abridge or restrict the free exercise of religion,

the Supreme Court used two substantially different standards at different times.

In *Sherbert v. Verner* (1963) the Court said government regulation of religious practice was constitutional only if it:

1. Served a compelling state interest.

2. <u>Was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest</u> with the least possible intrusion on free-exercise rights.

But in *Employment Division v. Smith* (1990) the Court adopted a much less strict standard. A law or regulation was constitutional if it was:

1. neutral

2. generally applicable

Since then, the Congress (for the federal government) and several state legislatures have required the stricter *Sherbert* standard.

Sources: Sherbert v. Verner (1963), Employment Division v. Smith (1990)

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The First Amendment: Standards of Interpretation The First Amendment: Standards of Interpretation

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